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Character Improvement 
Nicomachean Ethics
by Aristotle
350 BC
translated by W. D. Ross
Book 1, Chapter 1
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every
action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good
has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain
difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart
from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the
actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now,
as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end
of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy
victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single
capacity -- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of
horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under
strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others -- in all of these
the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for
it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no
difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or
something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just
mentioned.
Book 1, Chapter 2
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own
sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not
choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process
would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly
this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then,
have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to
aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline
at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it
is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that
which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature;
for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state,
and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should
learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under
this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of
the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what
we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the
others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the
same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events
something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it
is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more
godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends
at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that
term.
Book 1, Chapter 3
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all
discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just
actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and
fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention,
and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because
they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of
their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then,
in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth
roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most
part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no
better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be
received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each
class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently
equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand
from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good
judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that
subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in
general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political
science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its
discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends
to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end
aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is
young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but
on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to
such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those
who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such
matters will be of great benefit.
These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and
the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.
Book 1, Chapter 4
Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge
and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science
aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally
there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of
superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing
well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the
many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some
plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however,
from one another -- and often even the same man identifies it with different
things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious
of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is
above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods
there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these
as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat
fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be
arguable.
Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between
arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was right in
raising this question and asking, as he used to do, 'are we on the way from or
to the first principles?' There is a difference, as there is in a race-course
between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For,
while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two
senses -- some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must
begin with things known to us. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to
lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the subjects of
political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the
starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the
start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or
can easily get starting points. And as for him who neither has nor can get them,
let him hear the words of Hesiod:
Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when
men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another's
wisdom, is a useless wight.
Book 1, Chapter 5
Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed.
To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar
type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with
pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there
are, we may say, three prominent types of life -- that just mentioned, the
political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are
evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts,
but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high
places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the prominent types
of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition
identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the
political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for,
since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who
receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not
easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may
be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that
they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of
their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better.
And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honour, the end of
the political life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of
virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity,
and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was
living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all
costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in
the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall
consider later.
The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is
evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake
of something else. And so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be
ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these
are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us
leave this subject, then.
Book 1, Chapter 6
We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly
what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact
that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps
be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the
truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers
or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth
above our friends.
The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes within
which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they
did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers); but the term
'good' is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in
that of relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature
to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of being); so
that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods. Further, since
'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated both in the category
of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and
in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the
useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the
right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present
in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the
categories but in one only. Further, since of the things answering to one Idea
there is one science, there would have been one science of all the goods; but as
it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall under one category,
e.g. of opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and in
disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in
exercise by the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the question, what in
the world they mean by 'a thing itself', is (as is the case) in 'man himself'
and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as
they are man, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will
'good itself' and particular goods, in so far as they are good. But again it
will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is
no whiter than that which perishes in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to give a
more plausible account of the good, when they place the one in the column of
goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed.
But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we have
said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have not been
speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and loved for
themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while those which tend
to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are
called so by reference to these, and in a secondary sense. Clearly, then, goods
must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others
by reason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things
useful, and consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single
Idea. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are
pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain
pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake of
something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves. Or is
nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will
be empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves,
the account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them all,
as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honour,
wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are
distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element answering
to one Idea.
But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things that
only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived from
one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by analogy?
Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other
cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for
perfect precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch of
philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there is some one
good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and
independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but
we are now seeking something attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might think
it worth while to recognize this with a view to the goods that are attainable
and achievable; for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the
goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall attain them. This argument
has some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences;
for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency
of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents
of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid is
not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be
benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good itself', or how the
man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general thereby.
For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way, but the health of man,
or perhaps rather the health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is
healing. But enough of these topics.
Book 1, Chapter 7
Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It
seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in
strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely
that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in
strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else,
and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all
men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do,
this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one,
these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we
must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than
one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general
instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final
ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is
only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than
one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that which
is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit
for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake
of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in
themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final
without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the
sake of something else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we
choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour,
pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if
nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose
them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be
happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor,
in general, for anything other than itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow;
for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we
do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a
solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his
friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit
must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and
descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us
examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now
define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing;
and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all
things, without being counted as one good thing among others -- if it were so
counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the
least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods
the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and
self-sufficient, and is the end of action.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a
platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps
be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a
flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that
have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the
function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the
carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man
none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each
of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly
has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be
common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us
exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life
of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and
every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a
rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being
obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising
thought. And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must
state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be
the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity of
soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and
'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a
good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect
of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a
lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so
well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain
kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a
rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble
performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed
in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good
turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are
more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.
But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a
summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a
man blessed and happy.
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first
sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that
any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well
outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to which
facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is lacking. And
we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in
all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the
subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter
and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so
in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires
what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We
must act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task
may not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all
matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as
in the case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first
principle. Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception,
some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each set of
principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains
to state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows. For
the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the
questions we ask are cleared up by it.
Book 1, Chapter 8
We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and
our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view
all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now goods
have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others
as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly
and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to
soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this view,
which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we
identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among
goods of the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes
with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have
practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The
characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to
belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness
with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic
wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not
without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of
these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent
persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or
even in most respects.
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account
is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps,
no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in
state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing
any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive,
but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be
acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most
beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is
some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the
noble and good things in life.
Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and
to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is
a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights,
but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in
general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures
are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but
the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature
pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men
as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of
pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For,
besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not
even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly,
nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all
other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But
they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest
degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is
such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most
pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the
inscription at Delos --
Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest
is it to win what we love.
For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one --
the best -- of these, we identify with happiness.
Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is
impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many
actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there
are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good
birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or
ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a
man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or
had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to
need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify
happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.
Book 1, Chapter 9
For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to be
acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes
in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if there is any gift
of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and
most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this
question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems,
however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some
process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things; for that
which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world,
and something godlike and blessed.
It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are not
maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain kind of
study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus than by chance, it is
reasonable that the facts should be so, since everything that depends on the
action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly everything
that depends on art or any rational cause, and especially if it depends on the
best of all causes. To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would
be a very defective arrangement.
The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the definition
of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of soul, of a
certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as
conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as
instruments. And this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset;
for we stated the end of political science to be the best end, and political
science spends most of its pains on making the citizens to be of a certain
character, viz. good and capable of noble acts.
It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the
animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activity. For this
reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to
his age; and boys who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the
hopes we have for them. For there is required, as we said, not only complete
virtue but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all
manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in
old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced
such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy.
Book 1, Chapter 10
Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must we, as Solon
says, see the end? Even if we are to lay down this doctrine, is it also the case
that a man is happy when he is dead? Or is not this quite absurd, especially for
us who say that happiness is an activity? But if we do not call the dead man
happy, and if Solon does not mean this, but that one can then safely call a man
blessed as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, this also affords matter
for discussion; for both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead man, as
much as for one who is alive but not aware of them; e.g. honours and dishonours
and the good or bad fortunes of children and in general of descendants. And this
also presents a problem; for though a man has lived happily up to old age and
has had a death worthy of his life, many reverses may befall his descendants --
some of them may be good and attain the life they deserve, while with others the
opposite may be the case; and clearly too the degrees of relationship between
them and their ancestors may vary indefinitely. It would be odd, then, if the
dead man were to share in these changes and become at one time happy, at another
wretched; while it would also be odd if the fortunes of the descendants did not
for some time have some effect on the happiness of their ancestors.
But we must return to our first difficulty; for perhaps by a consideration
of it our present problem might be solved. Now if we must see the end and only
then call a man happy, not as being happy but as having been so before, surely
this is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is
not to be truly predicated of him because we do not wish to call living men
happy, on account of the changes that may befall them, and because we have
assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no means easily changed,
while a single man may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel. For clearly if we
were to keep pace with his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and
again wretched, making the happy man out to be chameleon and insecurely based.
Or is this keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in
life does not depend on these, but human life, as we said, needs these as mere
additions, while virtuous activities or their opposites are what constitute
happiness or the reverse.
The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For no function
of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these are thought to be
more durable even than knowledge of the sciences), and of these themselves the
most valuable are more durable because those who are happy spend their life most
readily and most continuously in these; for this seems to be the reason why we
do not forget them. The attribute in question, then, will belong to the happy
man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to
everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation, and he
will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is
'truly good' and 'foursquare beyond reproach'.
Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; small
pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not weigh down the scales
of life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events if they turn out
well will make life happier (for not only are they themselves such as to add
beauty to life, but the way a man deals with them may be noble and good), while
if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for they both bring pain
with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in these nobility shines through,
when a man bears with resignation many great misfortunes, not through
insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.
If activities are, as we said, what gives life its character, no happy man
can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean.
For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances life
becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances, as a good general makes
the best military use of the army at his command and a good shoemaker makes the
best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other craftsmen.
And if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable; though he
will not reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam.
Nor, again, is he many-coloured and changeable; for neither will he be moved
from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misadventures, but only by many
great ones, nor, if he has had many great misadventures, will he recover his
happiness in a short time, but if at all, only in a long and complete one in
which he has attained many splendid successes.
When then should we not say that he is happy who is active in accordance
with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for
some chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add 'and who is
destined to live thus and die as befits his life'? Certainly the future is
obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in every way
final. If so, we shall call happy those among living men in whom these
conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled -- but happy men. So much for these
questions.
Book 1, Chapter 11
That the fortunes of descendants and of all a man's friends should not
affect his happiness at all seems a very unfriendly doctrine, and one opposed to
the opinions men hold; but since the events that happen are numerous and admit
of all sorts of difference, and some come more near to us and others less so, it
seems a long -- nay, an infinite -- task to discuss each in detail; a general
outline will perhaps suffice. If, then, as some of a man's own misadventures
have a certain weight and influence on life while others are, as it were,
lighter, so too there are differences among the misadventures of our friends
taken as a whole, and it makes a difference whether the various suffering befall
the living or the dead (much more even than whether lawless and terrible deeds
are presupposed in a tragedy or done on the stage), this difference also must be
taken into account; or rather, perhaps, the fact that doubt is felt whether the
dead share in any good or evil. For it seems, from these considerations, that
even if anything whether good or evil penetrates to them, it must be something
weak and negligible, either in itself or for them, or if not, at least it must
be such in degree and kind as not to make happy those who are not happy nor to
take away their blessedness from those who are. The good or bad fortunes of
friends, then, seem to have some effects on the dead, but effects of such a kind
and degree as neither to make the happy unhappy nor to produce any other change
of the kind.
Book 1, Chapter 12
These questions having been definitely answered, let us consider whether
happiness is among the things that are praised or rather among the things that
are prized; for clearly it is not to be placed among potentialities. Everything
that is praised seems to be praised because it is of a certain kind and is
related somehow to something else; for we praise the just or brave man and in
general both the good man and virtue itself because of the actions and functions
involved, and we praise the strong man, the good runner, and so on, because he
is of a certain kind and is related in a certain way to something good and
important. This is clear also from the praises of the gods; for it seems absurd
that the gods should be referred to our standard, but this is done because
praise involves a reference, to something else. But if if praise is for things
such as we have described, clearly what applies to the best things is not
praise, but something greater and better, as is indeed obvious; for what we do
to the gods and the most godlike of men is to call them blessed and happy. And
so too with good things; no one praises happiness as he does justice, but rather
calls it blessed, as being something more divine and better.
Eudoxus also seems to have been right in his method of advocating the
supremacy of pleasure; he thought that the fact that, though a good, it is not
praised indicated it to be better than the things that are praised, and that
this is what God and the good are; for by reference to these all other things
are judged. Praise is appropriate to virtue, for as a result of virtue men tend
to do noble deeds, but encomia are bestowed on acts, whether of the body or of
the soul. But perhaps nicety in these matters is more proper to those who have
made a study of encomia; to us it is clear from what has been said that
happiness is among the things that are prized and perfect. It seems to be so
also from the fact that it is a first principle; for it is for the sake of this
that we all do all that we do, and the first principle and cause of goods is, we
claim, something prized and divine.
Book 1, Chapter 13
Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we
must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the
nature of happiness. The true student of politics, too, is thought to have
studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow citizens good
and obedient to the laws. As an example of this we have the lawgivers of the
Cretans and the Spartans, and any others of the kind that there may have been.
And if this inquiry belongs to political science, clearly the pursuit of it will
be in accordance with our original plan. But clearly the virtue we must study is
human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good and the happiness
human happiness. By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the
soul; and happiness also we call an activity of soul. But if this is so, clearly
the student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul, as the man who
is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or the body;
and all the more since politics is more prized and better than medicine; but
even among doctors the best educated spend much labour on acquiring knowledge of
the body. The student of politics, then, must study the soul, and must study it
with these objects in view, and do so just to the extent which is sufficient for
the questions we are discussing; for further precision is perhaps something more
laborious than our purposes require.
Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in the discussions
outside our school, and we must use these; e.g. that one element in the soul is
irrational and one has a rational principle. Whether these are separated as the
parts of the body or of anything divisible are, or are distinct by definition
but by nature inseparable, like convex and concave in the circumference of a
circle, does not affect the present question.
Of the irrational element one division seems to be widely distributed, and
vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutrition and growth; for it
is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to all nurslings and to
embryos, and this same power to fullgrown creatures; this is more reasonable
than to assign some different power to them. Now the excellence of this seems to
be common to all species and not specifically human; for this part or faculty
seems to function most in sleep, while goodness and badness are least manifest
in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy are not better off than the
wretched for half their lives; and this happens naturally enough, since sleep is
an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or bad),
unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements actually penetrate to the
soul, and in this respect the dreams of good men are better than those of
ordinary people. Enough of this subject, however; let us leave the nutritive
faculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in human excellence.
There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul -- one which
in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise the rational
principle of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their
soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright and towards the best
objects; but there is found in them also another element naturally opposed to
the rational principle, which fights against and resists that principle. For
exactly as paralysed limbs when we intend to move them to the right turn on the
contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people
move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which moves
astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must none the less suppose
that in the soul too there is something contrary to the rational principle,
resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other elements
does not concern us. Now even this seems to have a share in a rational
principle, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational
principle and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more
obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the
rational principle.
Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For the
vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the appetitive
and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it
listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of 'taking account'
of one's father or one's friends, not that in which we speak of 'accounting for
a mathematical property. That the irrational element is in some sense persuaded
by a rational principle is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all
reproof and exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have a
rational principle, that which has a rational principle (as well as that which
has not) will be twofold, one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in
itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's father.
Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference;
for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others moral,
philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being intellectual,
liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about a man's character we do
not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is good-tempered or
temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind;
and of states of mind we call those which merit praise virtues.
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